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United States agricultural policy has involved crop insurance programs since the era of 
the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl.  Initially federal crop insurance was designed and 
implemented to help farmers overcome prevented planting losses and to minimize risk due to 
low prices.  However in contemporary times, it is unclear whether the producer's primary 
benefit of the federal crop insurance program is risk reduction or income enhancement.  Rather 
than using crop insurance to manage risk as intended, a limited number of producers have 
exploited the program.  In April 2002, the Deputy Administrator for Compliance estimated that 
25 percent of all claims in the federal crop insurance program contain some element of fraud, 
waste, and abuse.  Overall, the crop insurance program provides positive gains for participating 
producers.  In reinsurance year 2000, insured producers paid $2.54 billion in premium for $34.4 
billion of coverage or liability and received $2.58 billion of indemnities for crop losses 
(RMAOnline).  
Fraud, waste, and abuse are a continuing concern within the federal crop insurance 
program.  Congress in 2000 passed legislation to expand and strengthen the program to address 
concerns regarding fraud, waste, and abuse.  The Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) of 
2000 was a major vote of confidence for the federal crop insurance program, and included $8.2 
billion in funding over five years to enhance and improve the federal crop insurance program.   
ARPA requires the USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA) to conduct program wide 
efforts (compliance, education, and insurance services) to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.  




detection of fraud, waste, and abuse increasingly more challenging. The lack of agronomic 
homogeneity across crops and across regions confounds identification of fraud, waste, or abuse.  
A major step toward preventing fraud, waste, and abuse is the development of tools to identify 
agricultural producers, insurance agents, loss adjusters, insurance companies, crops, and 
geographic areas that deviate from the norms established by the Risk Management Agency 
(H.R. 2559). 
  ARPA specifically states that RMA is to utilize data mining technology to reduce 
program vulnerabilities and waste, fraud, and abuse.  The specific objective of this study is to 
develop a data-mining algorithm and to apply the algorithm to identify anomalous producers 
and counties within Land Resource Regions (LRR) based upon the percentage of acres 
harvested.  
This research is the first to use data mining to identify anomalous county and producer 
behavior by mining data from the USDA/RMA Book of Business data warehouse at the Center 
for Agribusiness Excellence (CAE) and data from the Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(NRCS).  The NRCS LRRs will be used to group spatially insured producers into agronomical 
homogeneous groups to account for the natural resource variability.  However, weather 
variation was not addressed due to limitations regarding the scope of the project. 
  This paper proceeds with an overview of the data and methods.  The following section 
is a discussion of the results with two subsections regarding anomalous producers and 
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Data and Methods 
  This study focused on U.S. soybean acres and includes irrigated and non-irrigated 
practices.  Limiting the study to one crop facilitated the application of data mining to detect 
anomalous patterns of behavior in agricultural insurance.  Data for this study are from USDA's 
RMA policy database available, through the cooperative agreement between Tarleton State 
University and USDA's Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) (01-IE-0821-020).  Land 
Resource Region (LRR) data are available through the NRCS.   
Variables included in the data mart are: state and county code, LRR, reinsurance year, 
crop code, practice code, acres planted, acres harvested, liability, indemnity, producer 
premium, and risk premium.  The original dataset contained 625,031 unique producers and over 
2.58 million observations from reinsurance years 1994 to 2001. 
  The dependent variable for identifying anomalous behavior was the percentage of acres 
harvested, computed as the ratio of harvested acres to planted acres at the individual producer 
level.  The percentage of acres harvested was selected because it was a reliable indication of 
anomalous behavior based upon prior investigation of the data warehouse.    An exceptionally 
low percentage of acres harvested does not alone suggest that crop insurance fraud occurred.  It 
does suggest that further investigation may be warranted including the evaluation of absolute 
indemnity, liability, and premium amounts and associated ratios. 
  Prior to computing the percent of acres harvested, producer-level planted acres and 
harvested acres were determined.  Planted acres were calculated by summing all insured 
soybean acres for each unique producer and subtracting any acreage claimed as prevented 
planting.  Harvested acres were calculated as the planted acres minus any acreage claimed as 
unharvested and/or ungleaned.
   If no claims (unharvested or ungleaned) were filed on the 
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planted acres it was assumed that the acres were 100% harvested.  It is important to note that 
harvested acres may include claimed acres associated with lowered quality and/or quantity of 
production due to drought, heat, hail, frost, freeze, flood, wind, insects, mycotoxin, and plant 
disease.  However, this study only identified anomalous harvested acres.  
The producer data mart included only producers who planted soybeans three or more 
years between 1994 and 2001 to establish a reliable harvest history.  The data mart was 
comprised of 2.15 million records.  Five-year moving averages were computed within state, 
county, crop, and practice (irrigated and non-irrigated) from 1994 to 2001.  The smoothing 
procedure was applied to de-emphasize spikes and emphasize trends for percent of acres 
harvested.  When computing the five-year moving average, a grouping system was used to 
compensate for missing data.  Producers may not have planted soybeans every year; thus it was 
inappropriate to compare them to producers who had planted all five years.  Five groups of 
producers were identified during the moving-average process.  The group to which a producer 
was assigned depended upon the number of years the producer planted within the time period.  
In addition to the grouping process, another criteria was established to handle missing data.  A 
producer's percent of acres harvested had to exist for the last year within the five-year moving 
average period, e.g. if a producer did not plant in 1998, no moving-average percent was 
recorded in the time period ending in 1998.  However, if that producer planted in 1999, a 
moving average was recorded for 1999.    
Following the smoothing, the percentage was normalized by z-score within LRR: 
(z = (χi –x )/σ ). 
  LRRs were used because they identify natural resource characteristics as compared to 
risk rating regions or administrative districts.  LRRs do not conform to county lines.  If a 
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county was divided among two or more LRRs, the county was assigned to the LRR that 
included the largest proportion of the county.  Risk rating regions usually are designated by 
their crop yield capability.  Boundaries are changed and new regions are established, as the 
RMA Regional Office deems necessary.  Administrative districts are currently used by the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), but documentation describing the criteria used 
to set up the administrative districts was unavailable. 
After normalization, an outlier detection method was used to identify producers with 
anomalous harvest behavior.  A t-value was calculated for each producer within the five groups 
discussed above.  Only producers within the same group and LRR were compared.  Producers 
were identified as anomalous if they were at or below the 5
th percentile and had a p ≤ 0.05.  
Both assumptions had to be satisfied for the producer to be flagged.  The same procedure was 
applied to the first percentile and p ≤ 0.01.   
  Each county was regarded as a super producer.  All producer level data, including those 
excluded from the smoothing process with one or two years of data between 1994 and 2001, 
were aggregated to the county level.  The same outlier detection procedure was applied to the 
county level data mart to identify anomalous counties.  Counties were flagged at two levels, 5
th 
percentile and p ≤ 0.05, and 1
st percentile and p ≤ 0.01.     
Results  
Federal law prohibits this study from releasing any information that may specifically 
identify a specific producer.  All data presented here are aggregated either to the state or LRR 









  Following normalization of the producer data mart using z-scores, a t-value was 
calculated for each producer in each of the five groups (see methods).  The outlier detection 
method flagged 29,567 producer observations, 2.6 percent of final data mart, resulting in 
14,621 unique producers 
i at p ≤ 0.05.  At p ≤ 0.01, there were 13,999 producer observations, 
1.2 percent of final data mart, resulting in 7,786 unique producers.  Approximately 27 percent 
of flagged producers were identified as anomalous in three or more years, p ≤ 0.05.       
  In 2001, 7402 unique producers at p ≤ 0.05 were identified as anomalous accounting for 
2.2 percent of the 334,481 producers who insured soybeans.  The flagged producers accounted 
for 2.8 percent of the total premiums for all insured soybeans and 1.6 percent of the total 
liability.  Yet, they received a disproportionate 6.1 percent of the total soybean indemnities in 
2001 (Table 1).   
  The loss ratio (indemnity/premium) and the loss cost ratio (indemnity/liability) are 
frequently used indicators in crop insurance analysis.  These ratios further substantiate the 
anomalous nature of the flagged producers.  Table 2 shows the loss ratios and loss cost ratios 
for 2001. Outliers at p ≤ 0.05 have a loss ratio that is over twice as large as all insured soybean 
producers nationally.  The loss cost ratio is also indicative of the outliers' claim records being 
inconsistent with the national book of business. 
Anomalous Counties: 
 
The same outlier-detection method used for producers was used for counties.  
Following normalization of the county data mart using z-scores, a t-value was calculated for 
each county within the five groups as described above.  The outlier detection method flagged 
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404 county observations (4.7 percent of final data mart) at p ≤ 0.05 and 132 county 
observations (1.5 percent of final data mart) at p ≤ 0.01.   
The maps show county outliers in LRR by practice and reinsurance year at p ≤ 0.05 and 
p ≤ 0.01.  Visual inspection indicates that the majority of the outliers fall near LRR boundaries.  
Transitional soils near the boundaries may have caused the counties to be flagged. However, 
further investigation and additional research is necessary to test the hypothesis suggested by 
this anecdotal observation. 
Without regard to the group designation and practice, approximately 30 percent of the 
counties at p ≤ 0.05 were identified as anomalous for three or more years using the outlier-
detection method (Figure 1).  Even among the small number of soybean producing counties 
identified as anomalous three or more years, clustering occurs along LRR boundaries.  Further 
investigation appears warranted to evaluate possible vulnerability of crop insurance programs 
to LRR variation.   Counties identified as anomalous three or more years should be further 
scrutinized to determine why the percent harvested is so unusual.  Adjustments in insurance 




Identification of producers and counties as anomalous is not prima facie evidence of 
fraud.  However, the outlier detection of anomalous producers and anomalous counties leads to 
some interesting questions because both sets of outliers cluster at or near LRR boundaries.  
Although no publications were located that correlated production and LRR interfaces, it is 
agronomically intuitive that yield variations likely increase at soil transition zones.  Additional 
investigation and research should examine and identify improved production practices that are 
appropriate at or near transitional soils.  Future investigation of these patterns should consider 
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weather variation; for example it is an empirical observation that weather patterns in Iowa are 
different from those in Texas or Oklahoma, for example.  Also, variation in the current 
investigation was dampened by the use of: (1) moving averages, (2) normalization, and (3) 
aggregation.  Therefore, the results of the current investigation should be considered 
preliminary and not conclusive, but do identify an area rich with interesting research questions.  
Strategies may need to be devised specifically for soybean producers to adapt farming practices 
to accommodate the variation in plant performance in the transitional soil zones.    
Producers identified as anomalous may not be committing fraud, but program waste 
may be occurring.  The loss ratios and loss cost ratios for the outlier producers exceed the 
national book of business across the board and are resulting in a drain on taxpayer dollars.  
Analysis of insurance provisions and possible adjustments, including county T-yields along 
LRR boundaries, may deserve consideration. 
   Further analysis of agricultural production variation along LRR boundaries is needed.  
Additional research at CAE has been directed toward determining whether or not anomalous 
producers/anomalous counties along LRR boundaries would still be flagged in adjacent 
regions, in situations where one or more LRRs are represented within the county.  In that 
analysis since LRRs do not conform to county lines, counties were assigned to the LRR with 
the smallest proportion of LRR.  The reassignment of LRRs to counties did not significantly 
change the results.  The same frequency distributions for flagged producers and flagged 
counties occurred after the change in LRR assignment.  Furthermore, the same clustering effect 









i  A unique producer is determined by a distinct tax identification (social security number or 
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Table 1.  Total Premium, Indemnity, and Liability for U.S. and Anomalous  
Soybean Producers, 2001 
 U.S.  Totals, 
Insured Soybeans 
Outliers        
p ≤ 0.05 
% of U.S. 
Total 
Outliers      
p ≤ 0.01 
% of U.S. 
Total 
Producers  334,481  7402  2.2 3169 1.1 
Premium  $   509,317,484  $  14,370,174  2.8  $  4,523,429  0.9 
Indemnity  $   317,216,531  $  19,206,378  6.1  $  7,715,366  2.4 
Liability  $6,986,028,281  $111,460,031 1.6 $32,573,703 0.5 
 
 
Table 2.  Loss and Loss Cost Ratios for 2001 
 U.S.  Insured 
Soybeans 
Soybean Outliers    
p ≤ 0.05 
Soybean Outliers    
p ≤ 0.01 
Loss Ratio
a  0.62 1.34 1.70 
Loss Cost Ratio
b  0.05 0.17 0.24 
a Loss Ratio = Indemnity / Premium. 
b Loss Cost Ratio = Indemnity / Liability. 
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